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I. INTRODUCTION
TracFone Wireless, Inc. ("TracFone") - the largest provider of prepaid wireless service in
the United States

has consistently failed to remit the statutorily required 911 fee ("E911 Fee")

as authorized by the Emergency Communications Act ("Act") since it began offering its services
in Idaho in 1997. 1 In an attempt to justify its non-remittance, TracFone continues to make the
same argument to this Court as it did to the District Court below - that TracFone, even though it
provides the exact same services to its customers as other wireless providers

is exempt from

the Act's E911 Fee collection and remittance requirements simply because it resells those
services on a prepaid basis.2

TracFone spends the first portion of its Appellant's Reply Brief and Cross-Respondent's Brief
("Response Brief') arguing that the Counties "immediately misstate the facts salient to this
dispute" by making the following statement in their Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief: "Since being
allowed to operate in Idaho, TracFone has refused to remit the statutorily required emergency
communications fee .... " Response Brief, p. 1. TracFone argues that through this statement, the
Counties have alleged that they "possess the power to determine what entities are 'allowed to
operate in Idaho."' Id. The Counties' statement, like the remainder of their Brief, says nothing
of the sort. The Counties are aware that the federal government has authority regarding mobile
radio communications, and have never stated or implied that this obligation falls to local
authorities.
2 Another matter worth brief mention is that by citing Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938),
TracFone again raises the notion that issues regarding statutory construction should be resolved
in favor of the taxpayer. While the Counties have objected to TracFone's assertion of taxpayer
status in other briefings filed in this case, it is discussed here in answer to TracFone's assertion
that the IAC did not raise the issue before the District Court. See Response Brief, pp. 21-25. In
fact, the IAC did raise this issue during oral argument before the District Court. 01/04/13 Tr. p.
170, 11. 7-25; p. 171, 11. 1-5. In any event, there has been no finding in this case that TracFone is
a taxpayer, so its conclusory assertion should not be given credence. Further, TracFone's
additional assertion that the IAC is the "only party contesting the taxing nature of the E-911 fee"
is incorrect. Response Brief, p. 21, fn. 15. Ada County made its own arguments on the subject,
and also joined the IAC's arguments, in its Respondent Ada County's Brief. Respondent Ada
County's Brief, p. 14, n. 7; p. 1, n. 1.
1

1

In its Response Brief, TracFone continues to paint an incomplete picture of the relevant
facts and law by focusing this Court's attention on a few words taken from the Act and carefully
selected sentences from pertinent case law. By doing so, TracFone ignores the dictates of this
Court and leaves huge factual and legal gaps, and consequently offers no substantive arguments
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addressing the Counties' position that the District Court erred by holding that TracFone is not a
certain specialized mobile radio provider pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-4802(15), even though it
is designated as a covered carrier by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") in
47 C.F.R. § 20.18.
Ada County and the Idaho Association of Counties ("IAC") file this Cross-Appellants'
Joint Reply Brief3 in further support of their position that TracFone is a wireless carrier as
defined by Idaho Code § 31-4802(15), and is thus a telecommunications provider pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(b) and subject to the E91 l Fee collection and remittance duties of the
Act. 4
II. ARGUMENT

As has been the case since the start of this litigation, TracFone makes the analysis of
Idaho Code§ 31-4802(15), and thus§ 31-4802(13)(b), more difficult than it needs to be. As
used in the statute, "mobile radio providers" simply means those providers of mobile radio in the
generic sense (providers of communications based on radio frequencies).

And, "certain

Throughout this Cross-Appellants' Joint Reply Brief, the IAC and Ada County will be
collectively referred to as "Counties."
4 In light of the position of the parties set forth in the Stipulated Motion to Augment the Record
on file with this Court, the IAC will not address the portion of TracFone's Response Brief
concerning the allegation that the IAC's Cross-Appeal is improper.
3

2
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specialized mobile radio providers" are simply those mobile radio providers identified by the
FCC in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18.
TracFone convinced the District Court to follow its incorrect and hyper-technical
argument that the actual language in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15)

"certain specialized mobile

radio providers" - really means "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems," or "SMRS," as defined in
a section of the Code of Federal Regulations ("C.F.R.") that is not specifically referred to in the
state statute. As the Counties have shown in their Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief and now below,
the unambiguous statutory language clearly refers to the common usage of the words, and
TracFone's attempts to force an unreferenced C.F.R. definition into the Idaho statute fail. 5

A.

TracFone Leaves Out Significant Portions of the History of "Specialized Mobile
Radio Systems."
In an attempt to convince this Court that "certain specialized mobile radio providers" is a

technical term, TracFone provides an extremely abridged and incorrect version of the history of
Specialized Mobile Radio services, 6 stating:
For the benefit of the Court, TracFone sees merit in identifying some history
regarding the types of services that are common to specialized mobile radio
services, as such a discussion will assist the Court's understanding of how
If this Court were to adopt TracFone's position that the words "certain specialized mobile radio
providers" actually means "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems," and that "Specialized Mobile
Radio Systems" only includes dispatch services, the result would be that "public safety providers
like police and fire departments and medical rescue teams" would be deemed "wireless carriers"
under Idaho Code § 31-4802(15). See TracFone' s Response Brief, p. 3 3. This argument is
nonsensical, as the result would be that the providers of public safety services would be required
to collect E911 Fees from, and remit to, themselves.
6 The acronym "SMRS" stands for "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems," not "Specialized
Mobile Radio Services" as used by TracFone. See National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners v. Federal Communications Commission, 525 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
5
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markedly different TracFone's services are from those encompassed by the SMRS
category ....
Response Brief, p. 33 (emphasis in original).
TracFone then provides two separate one-paragraph citations that purport to fully set
forth this history. Id., pp. 33-34. As one can imagine, the over 40-year history of such complex
technology cannot be summed up in two short paragraphs. Therefore, at this point, it is worth
revisiting the history of the federal regulations and case law that existed prior to and
contemporaneous with the time the Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code § 31-4802 to add the
definition of "wireless carrier," in order to fill in the extensive blanks left by TracFone so that the
Court can better understand the full nature of mobile radio services in the generic sense, and also
the technical term "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems." 7
The logical starting point for this discussion is the seminal case of National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Federal Communications Commission, 525 F.2d 630

(D.C. Cir. 1976). In 1974, the FCC issued an order, later modified in 1975 ("1975 Order") that
allocated the frequency spectrum in the 806-921 MHz band, and regulated the future use of that
spectrum, to land mobile radio service, which is "radio communication services, based on land,
where either the transmitting or receiving station is mobile." Id. p. 634. At the time, land mobile
radio services consisted of two general types

public services, which were operated by common

carriers and made available to the public (the most common type being radio telephone services
that interconnected with existing telephone systems), and private services, which included all
7

The Counties' history is taken from various D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals cases brought
against the FCC over the last 40 years.
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other mobile radio operations which were not subject to common carrier regulations (prior to the
1975 Order, private services consisted of, but were not limited to, predominantly dispatch
services operated by police and fire departments, and taxicab companies for their own use). Id.
The FCC's 1975 Order had three objectives pertaining to land mobile radio services.
First, it allocated 40 MHz of the total 115 MHz on the 900 MHz band "to the development of a
nationwide, broad-band, 'cellular' mobile radio communications system," which would be a
public common carrier system expanding the capacity of radio telephone service. Id. In addition
to providing radio telephone service, the cellular systems were allowed to also engage in
dispatch operations. Id.
The 1975 Order also allocated 30 MHz on the 900 MHz band to private services, to be
licensed to operators in the public safety, industrial and land transportation areas "who wish to
obtain a license to operate a station, either for their own private purposes, or, with several other
eligibles, on a non-profit, cost-sharing basis." Id. Most importantly, the Order also created a
new category of private mobile operators who would be eligible for licensing on this 30 MHz,
called Specialized Mobile Radio Systems ("SMRS"). Id.

SMRS operators would operate on a

commercial basis to provide services to third parties on a for-profit basis. Id.

"Because it

[sought] to utilize a profit motive to speed development and refinement of mobile radio
technologies, the Commission conclude[d] that SMRS should not be subject to the common
carrier regulations ... and that state certification of SMRS should be preempted." Id., pp. 634635. These entrepreneurial mobile operators

SMRS

would share access to this allocated

spectrum with the other private operators that consisted primarily of dispatch services which the

5
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operator would provide to himself, such as police or taxicab services. Id. at 639. By placing
SMRS with the private operators and likewise classifying them as non-common carriers, the
FCC ensured that SMRS would not fall under the same stringent regulations as common carriers
and avoided state regulation. 8 Id., p. 640.
Contrary to TracFone's assertions, from the inception of SMRS, the courts and the FCC
clearly spoke in terms of multiple types of SMRS rather than a single type of mobile radio
provider (i.e. dispatch providers). This concept was further developed in P & R Temmer v.
Federal Communications Commission, 743 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which also shows the

continuing technological evolution taking place at the time:
Land mobile radio services are radio communications based on land, where either
the transmitting or receiving station is mobile .... Land mobile radio services are
of two general types. Public services are operated by common carrier licensees
and made available to members of the public. The most common type of public
services are radio telephone services which interconnect with existing telephone
systems .... This type has recently become popularized as "cordless telephones"
or "car telephones" although, strictly speaking, they are not telephones since they
are merely connected to a telephone system by a radio link. The other type of land
mobile radio service is known as private services and includes all those not
subject to common carrier regulation. These include dispatch services such as
those operated by police and fire departments and taxicab companies .... They
also extend, however, to services provided to a limited group of users by third
party operators. It is this last group that is involved in this case.
In the private land mobile services area, the Commission adopted policies that
made it possible for entrepreneurs seeking to operate radio systems for others on a
commercial basis to obtain their own system licenses. These commercially
operated private radio systems became known as "Specialized Mobile Radio
Systems" ("SMRS").

The third effect of the 197 5 Order was the designation of the remaining 45 MHz of the total
115 MHz allocation for reserve and future growth. Id., p. 635.

8
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Id. at 921-922.
It is again evident that the concept of SMRS was one in which multiple types of systems

were contemplated, rather than a single type of mobile radio operation.
The primary purpose for classifying SMRS as a private land mobile radio service was
that the FCC did not want SMRS deemed a common carrier and thus subject to stringent federal
and state regulations. However, by 1997, industry technology had evolved to the point where the
FCC determined that further regulation was required. The court in Chadmoore Communications,
Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 113 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1997), described this
evolution as follows:
Specialized mobile radio ("SMR") systems are commercially operated private
communication systems that employ mobile transmitting and/or receiving
stations. In the beginning, these systems were used primarily to provide highly
localized services, such as the radio dispatching of police cars and taxicabs. In
recent years, however, emerging SMR technologies have enabled licensees to
offer their customers sophisticated voice and data transmission services over
extensive areas (e.g., two-way acknowledgment paging, credit card authorization,
automatic vehicle location, remote database access, and voice mail) ....
Originally, the FCC issued licenses by ascertaining whether an application
satisfied certain criteria. Licensees of the 280 SMR-only channels were assigned
either one or five channels at a time on a station-by-station basis. As a general
rule, stations operating on the same channel must be a minimum of seventy miles
apart. With the advent of new technologies, however, SMR service operators
became interested in packaging large numbers of stations for the purpose of
creating systems that could serve vast geographic areas. Because of the expense
and complexity associated with the creation of these systems, the FCC modified
its regulations to make applicants eligible for "extended implementation
authority," which would extend the periods within which the applicants' widearea systems would have to be completed ....
In August 1993, Congress amended the Communications Act to create two
categories of mobile service-commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS") and

7
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private mobile radio service; and it directed the Commission to implement these
categories in its regulations and provide for comparable regulation of substantially
similar CMRS systems. The FCC subsequently classified any wide-area SMR
system offering interconnected service for profit, such as the one Chadmoore
proposed, as a CMRS.
The FCC then began to amend its existing regulations to treat SMR and CMRS
systems alike; and in its Further NP RM, the FCC initiated a rulemaking to
implement a framework for licensing SMRs that would facilitate development of
wide-area, multi-channel SMR systems in competition with cellular and
broadband personal communications services systems. The notice observed that
the FCC was relying increasingly on competitive bidding for the licensing of new
SMR services.
Chadmoore Communications, Inc., 113 F .3d at 23 7 (internal citations omitted).

In 1997, the FCC created two categories of mobile radio service - private mobile radio
service and, importantly, the new category of Commercial Mobile Radio Services ("CMRS").
The FCC moved SMRS into the newly-created CMRS, meaning that CMRS was now a subset of
SMRS. CMRS grew out of SMRS and, in essence, became a for-profit SMRS. Moreover, it was
the FCC's intention that SMRS and CMRS merged and were subject to the same regulations.
By the mid-2000's, courts and the FCC were still speaking of types of systems as
opposed to a single type of mobile radio provider when discussing SMRS and CMRS. Also
during that time, the FCC issued further orders that reconfigured the spectrum's 800 MHz band
in order to eliminate interference with public safety communications.
Under the plan ... 800 MHz licensees which operate Specialized Mobile Radio
(SMR) Systems that broadcast signals from a base station antenna situated at a
high elevation, will be segregated from licensees who operate Enhanced
Specialized Mobile Radio (ESMR) systems, which use smaller and more
numerous base stations and a cellular network architecture.
Mobile Relay Assocs. v. Federal Communication Commission, 457 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

8
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The D.C. Circuit in A1obile Relay discussed the origins of the FCC licensing in the 800
MHz band spectrum and the creation of Specialized Mobile Radio Systems, and went on to
discuss the evolution of enhanced SMR systems.
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Later 800 MHz licensees developed "enhanced" SMR, or ESMR, systems. In an
ESMR system the system operator divides the service area into several multiple
antenna sites, placed at a lower altitude, each of which is called a "cell" and
operates at a lower power and covers a smaller area than an SMR high-site
antenna. Unlike the SMR system, in which the operator assigns the user a single
channel for the entire service area, in the ESMR system the same channel may be
used in non-adjacent cells by different users at the same time. As the mobile unit
moves from one cell to another, the communications link is automatically
"handed off' to the next cell and the channel switches with no noticeable effect on
the user. The ESMR system can support a greater number of users than the SMR
system and, because it allows for a frequency's reuse within the same system, is a
more efficient--and therefore more profitable--use of spectrum ....
As ESMR system use increased, so too did interference with the high-site public
safety systems in the 800 MHz band. The source of the interference was the
overlap of the different architectures and their operations' proximity on the
spectrum, particularly where a public safety mobile or portable radio was within
an ESMR transmitter's range. Specifically, public safety radio users experienced
coverage loss in areas where adequate coverage previously existed within their
site-based system. For example, if an en route police officer or firefighter near
the outermost border of his site-based network's range attempted to communicate
by portable radio with a distant base station and was also within the range of a
low-power, low-elevation cell site using an adjacent band frequency, his
communication could be disrupted and he could miss a critical transmission from
his base station or be unable to call for assistance.

Id., 4-5.
Further emphasizing the various types of SMRS in operation, the court noted that
"traditional cellular telephone systems are similar to ESMR systems in terms of their system
architectures and the service they provide to consumers but they operate in a different spectrum
band and use somewhat different technology . . . . Unlike other cellular telephone providers,

.
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intervenors Nextel and Southern LINC operate in the 800 MHz band." Id., p. 4, n. 2. At the
time, Nextell, a cellular telephone provider, was the largest 800 MHz licensee and ESMR system
operator in the United States. Id., p. 5.
As can be seen, and contrary to TracFone's continued assertions, the FCC and the courts
interpreting the FCC's orders frequently discuss mobile radio providers in the generic sense.
Further, the FCC and courts also discuss the technical term SMRS as encompassing much more
than a single type of service, as clearly evidenced by the fact that Nextell, a provider of cellular
telephone service, was an SMRS operator. Not being subject to extensive state and federal
regulations allowed SMRS to evolve extensively over the years, until the FCC determined that
regulations were needed, resulting in the creation of CMRS which clearly grew out of the
previously existing SMRS. Since TracFone has repeatedly admitted that it is a CMRS, given the
above history, TracFone would be considered an SMRS by virtue of being a CMRS.
B.

TracFone Offers No Valid Argument that the Statutory Language "Certain
Specialized Mobile Radio Providers" is a Technical Term.

As the Counties have continuously argued, the Idaho Legislature used the unambiguous
words "certain specialized mobile radio providers" in the generic sense, with the intended result
being as long as a specialized mobile radio provider was specifically identified by the FCC as a
covered carrier in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18, then that certain provider is a wireless carrier and thus a
telecommunications provider under Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 )(b ).
Despite these valid arguments, TracFone devotes a portion of its Response Brief to the

I

argument that the Counties have offered no "common-meaning explanation of 'specialized
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mobile radio"' and that the Counties do not take a cognizable position on the meaning of the
word "specialized." Response Brief, pp. 30-37. However, and especially in light of the abovediscussed history, 9 it is common knowledge that "mobile radio providers" broadly refers to
providers of communications systems which are based on radio frequencies.

Counties have continuously asserted, and do again here, that the word "specialized" was used in
the generic sense to describe all types of mobile radio providers which are specifically identified
by the FCC in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 that connect the public to 911 services. 10
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Further, the

When drafting the definition of "wireless carrier" located in Idaho Code § 31-4802(15),
the Legislature chose to incorporate the lowercase words "certain specialized mobile radio
providers" and did not use the capitalized, specific term "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" as
the FCC did when it created such Systems in 1975. See National Association of Regulatory

Utility Commissioners, 525 F.2d 630.

By choosing these exact words, the Legislature

incorporated into the definition of "wireless carrier" those certain specialized mobile radio
providers specifically identified by the FCC as covered carriers in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 and any
successor to such rule.
Courts also differentiate between the term "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" and the
broader, generic "mobile radio systems." For instance, when discussing the appropriateness of

See discussion of land mo bile radio services, supra.
Importantly, the Legislature specifically included the language "and any successor to such
rule" in order to take into account the fact that mobile radio providers and 911 services would
evolve. In other words, the Legislature did not intend that individual terms used in the Idaho
statutes and Federal Regulations be seized upon as if set in stone, so that a clearly covered entity
that entered the market at a later date would never be included in the statutory scheme.
9

10
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allocating 40MHz to the development of a cellular mobile radio system, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals stated, "In light of the wide ranging arguments as to appropriate spectrum width, we
cannot say that the allocation of 40 MHz to this experimental mobile radio system was either
unreasonably large or unreasonably small."

National Association of Regulatory Utility

Commissioners, 525 F.2d at 636 (emphasis added). This is the same Court (in the same case)

that discussed the creation of "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" by the FCC.

"Such

substantial domination would be undesirable both because it would weaken incentives for
development of improved mobile radio systems, and because it would enhance the already
enormous overall economic power as the Bell System." Id., 637 (emphasis added). The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals also discussed and defined the general term "land mobile radio
services" in its cases discussing SMRS. See Id. at 634; P & R Temmer, 743 F.2d at 921-922.
The Legislature evidenced foresight by choosing to use the words "certain specialized
mobile radio providers" in the generic sense, as the clear intent of the Act set forth in Idaho Code
§ 31-4801 is to cast a big net in order to encompass all providers of services that connect an

individual dialing 911 to a public safety answering point. If the Legislature used technical
language in the statute - language whose meaning could change over time - the Legislature
would have potentially left out providers who should be subject to the Act and thus limited the
funding sources available for the state's E911 dispatch systems.
Clearly, the Legislature intended for all providers of services that connect an individual
dialing 911 to a dispatch center to be subject to the Fee collection and remittance duties of the
Act, and would have had no legitimate reason for limiting those wireless carriers who would be
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covered by the Act.

The only limiting language would come from the FCC itself - the

governmental entity which would have the most knowledge regarding the ever-changing
technology - through 47 C.F.R. § 20.18. Consequently, only those "certain specialized mobile
radio providers designated as covered carriers by the federal communications commission in 47
C.F.R. § 20.18 and any successor to such rule" are considered wireless carriers. 11
Given the above history and the language found in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18, both now and at the
time the Legislature amended Idaho Code § 31-4802(13), TracFone is and was a designated
covered carrier by the FCC.

C.

TracFone is a Certain Specialized Mobile Radio Provider Designated as a Covered
Carrier by the FCC, and is thus a Wireless Carrier Subject to the Act.
Given that the technology in this field is highly evolving, it makes sense that the FCC and

I
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its regulations would also evolve in order to stay current with technology. In reviewing the
evolution of 4 7 C.F.R. § 20.18 in particular, it becomes clear that the Idaho Legislature was not
referring to the "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" as created by the FCC in 1975, but rather to
the generic, more broadly defined mobile radio providers.
In 2003, the Legislature added the definition of "wireless carrier" found in Idaho Code
§ 31-4802(15) to the Emergency Communications Act. See Respondent Ada County's Brief, pp.
2-3.

When this definition was added to the Idaho Code, the relevant version of 47 C.F.R.

§ 20.18, as referenced in the definition, was the October 1, 2002 version. The stated purpose of
these federal rules, both in 2002 and today, was "to set forth the requirements and conditions
In addition to cellular licensees and personal communications service licensees.
§ 31-4802(15).
11
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See I.C.
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applicable to commercial mobile radio service providers." 4 7 C.F.R. § 20.1 (2002); (2010).
Section 20.18 applied then, as today, to 911 service. In 2002, the scope of the section was as
follows:
The following requirements are only applicable to Broadband Personal
Communications Services 12 (part 24, subpart E of this chapter), Cellular Radio
Telephone Service (part 22, subpart H of this chapter), and Geographic Area
Specialized Mobile Radio Services 13 and Incumbent Wide Area SMR Licensees
in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands (included in part 90, subpart S of this
chapter).
47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2002).
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At that time, CMRS, as a subset of SMRS, need not have been specifically listed in 47
C.F.R. § 20.18, as the stated purpose of the regulation was to set forth the requirements and
conditions applicable to commercial mobile radio service providers. Clearly, all of the types of
services specifically identified in 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 in 2002, and today, are CMRS, since the
requirements and conditions are to apply to CMRS.
The 2005 version of 47 C.F.R. § 20.18, which was applicable when the Legislature added
Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(c) and (d) in 2007, applied to the following:
The following requirements are only applicable to Broadband Personal
Communications Services (part 24, subpart E of this chapter), Cellular Radio
Telephone Service (part 22, subpart H of this chapter), and Geographic Area
Specialized Mobile Radio Services and Incumbent Wide Area SMR Licensees in
the 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands (included in part 90, subpart S of this chapter)
12

Broadband Personal Communications Services ("PCS") operate in the 1850-1990 MHz
spectrum range and are used in mobile voice and data services, including cell phones, text
messaging and Internet service. See FCC Encyclopedia; www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia.
13 The "wide-area, multi-channel SMR systems in competition with cellular and broadband
personal communications services systems" referred to in the Chadmoore case. See Chadmoore
Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d at 237.
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and those entities that offer voice service to consumers by purchasing airtime or
capacity at wholesale rates from these licensees, collectively CMRS providers. In
addition, service providers in these enumerated services are subject to the
following requirements solely to the extent that they offer real-time, two way
switched voice service that is interconnected with the public switched network
and utilize an in-network switching facility which enables the provider to reuse
frequencies and accomplish seamless hand-offs of subscriber calls.

47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2005) (emphasis added). The FCC made this change to specifically include
resellers like TracFone. As of 2005, without a doubt, TracFone was a covered carrier.
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Then, as of October 1, 2010, the FCC removed from 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 all references to
"Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" and anything close to that term. Today, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18
specifically applies to all CMRS providers, with the exception of mobile satellite service

operators. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2013). The for-profit technology has now arrived to the point
where SMRS providing interconnectivity is regulated as a type of CMRS by the FCC. See 47
CFR § 20.9. 14
D.

TracFone Provides No Valid Argument In Support of the District Court's Denial of
Ada County's Motions to Strike Portions of the Baldino, Lloyd and Lane Affidavits.

Since TracFone has failed to make any substantive arguments in response to Ada
Even if this Court determines that, as used in the statute, "certain specialized mobile radio
providers" is a technical term, given the history of "Specialized Mobile Radio Systems" as
outlined above, TracFone is still a "wireless carrier" pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-4802(15).
CMRS (that which TracFone claims it is) was in its formative stages at the time the Legislature
passed the definition of "wireless carrier" in 2003, and was an evolving category of SMRS that
consisted of profit-based SMRS entities. Now that market forces and technology have placed
CMRS in the forefront of FCC regulation, SMRS and CMRS are treated by the FCC as one and
the same. This is precisely why the Legislature allowed for the evolution of 47 C.F .R. § 20.18 in
Idaho Code§ 31-4802(15). Both in 2003 and today, CMRS (including TracFone) were "certain"
SMR providers in the sense the word is often used, meaning "fixed" or "of a specific but
unspecified character." Merriam-Webster. com. Meriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 2014.
http://www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/certain.
14
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County's appeal of the District Court's rulings regarding certain of its Motions to Strike, Ada
County will rely primarily on its arguments set forth in the Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief,

but

offers the following comments below. 16
1.

The District Court's Decision not to Strike the Baldino Affidavit Was in Error.

Ada County's first Objection and Motion to Strike (R. pp. 908-913) was directed at the
Baldino Affidavit. R. pp. 852-884. Ms. Baldino's Affidavit explains that in her capacity as a
paralegal employed by TracFone's counsel, she was instructed by one of her supervising
attorneys to conduct an internet search regarding certain FCC licensing information for
TracFone. R. p. 853. Through her Affidavit, Ms. Baldino testified that she was unable to locate
any such FCC licensing records.
Ada County's objection was simply that Ms. Baldino was not a proper sponsonng
witness since she could not lay the necessary evidentiary foundation for the non-existence of
FCC records. Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence 803(7) and/or ( 10), testimony establishing
the absence of a filed record requires actual knowledge about filing practices and procedures.
This requires greater familiarity with the records, compared to the requirements for establishing
the foundation for the existence of records. The Baldino Affidavit includes no basis for her
familiarity and knowledge regarding FCC record filing practices and procedures.
Therefore, Ada County submits that the determination by the District Court to admit the
Baldino Affidavit was an abuse of its discretion and that decision should be overruled.
15

See Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief, pp. 21-31.
As the IAC did not cross-appeal the District Court's decisions as to Ada County's Motions to
Strike, the IAC does not join Ada County's arguments as set forth in Section II.D. herein.
16
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2.

The District Court's Decision not to Strike the Llovd and Lang Affidavits Was in
Error.

Ada County's other Objections and Motions to Strike (R. pp. 1720-1727) were directed at
TracFone's counsel's affidavit ("Lloyd Affidavit") (R. pp. 1102-1672) and TracFone's Assistant
General Counsel's affidavit ("Lang Affidavit") (R. pp. 1068-1101 ).

Both Affidavits were

submitted in support ofTracFone's motion to reconsider its summary judgment loss.
The District Court initially struck both in their entirety. R. pp. 1842-1843. However,
fourteen days later, via a footnote in its supporting memorandum (R. p. 1876), TracFone
resubmitted the stricken Affidavits in support of its Motion for Certification for appeal to this
Court. R. pp. 1860-1864. Ada County objected to the resubmission, but this time the District
Court allowed both Affidavits into evidence, explaining that the "Supreme Court is going to have
it anyway." 01/31/14 Tr. p. 185, 11. 10-12. Ada County cross-appealed the decision, submitting
that the District Court abused its discretion.
In its briefing, TracFone asserts that it resubmitted the Affidavits so that the District
Court could consider the contents and determine that there are "substantial grounds for
difference of opinion" as to statutory interpretation.

Response Brief, p. 39.

However, as

previously argued by Ada County, the statutes at issue are not ambiguous and as such, there is no
reason to seek evidence outside the wording of the statutes themselves.
TracFone also asserts that Ada County should be prohibited from cross-appealing the
District Court's decision to consider the Affidavits because TracFone, rather than Ada County,
appealed. TracFone's argument seems to be that Ada County should be precluded from cross-
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appealing, smce it has "taken advantage of this interlocutory appeal to appeal [its] own
disagreements with the District Court."

Response Brief, p. 39.

TracFone cites no rule or

decision in support of its premise that Ada County cannot raise issues on cross-appeal. Since
Ada County properly raised these objections below and timely cross-appealed the District
Court's ruling, TracFone's argument fails.
Furthermore, as Ada County has previously submitted, neither of the Affidavits are
admissible. This Court has explained: "[T]he accepted rule in most jurisdictions is that the
beliefs of one legislator do not establish that the legislature intended something other than its
express declaration." Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264,268, 92 P.3d 514,519 (2004) (abrogated
on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 231 P.3d 524 (2009)). Given that a
single legislator's beliefs as to legislative intent may not be considered by the courts, the beliefs
of one of the litigant's attorneys, a volunteer commission member's comments and an internet
pamphlet are hardly authority as to a court's legal interpretation of a statute.
TracFone also argues, based upon a misconstruction ofldaho Rule of Evidence 105, that
the Lloyd and Lang Affidavits are admissible because they were submitted for a different
purpose the second time. TracFone then undermines its own argument, explaining that it first
introduced the Lloyd and Lang Affidavits to support its "statutory construction and

interpretation" argument. Response Brief, p. 39 (emphasis added). TracFone explains that the
"other purpose" for which it introduced the Affidavits the second time was to show that "there
were 'substantial grounds' for a difference of opinion on the underlying statutory interpretation

issues." Id. (emphasis added).

Thus, even though TracFone argues that it resubmitted the
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Affidavits for another purpose, its explanation is that both submissions were for statutory
interpretation purposes.
TracFone's argument also fails because Idaho Rule of Evidence 105 does not mean what
TracFone submits. Rule 105 reads:
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly.
Entitled "Limited Admissibility," the Rule is generally applicable to circumstances
involving co-parties. For example, where evidence is admissible against party "A" but not party
"B," this Rule directs the court to instruct the jury that the evidence can only be considered
against "A" and not "B." The Rule may also be applied where evidence is admitted against party
"A" but is to be used only for the purpose of evidencing "A's" ability to form intent to commit a
crime, not to prove he/she actually committed the crime. See State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 157 (Ct.
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App. 1996). Again, because TracFone resubmitted the Affidavits for the same reason as it did
originally, the Rule does not apply.
TracFone has failed to provide this Court with a legal basis for upholding the District
Court's decision to admit the Lloyd and Lang Affidavits.

Accordingly, this Court should

overturn the District Court's decision to admit the Affidavits.

E.

Attorney Fees on Cross-Appeal.
The Counties request costs and attorney fees on Cross-Appeal pursuant to Idaho Code

§§ 12-121, 12-123 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. TracFone argues that the Counties have failed
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to ask for attorney fees under the proper sections, but in a footnote 17 it concedes that this Court
explained there is an "exception," and Idaho Code § 12-121 may apply where a governmental
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entity seeks attorney fees:
The State seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to sections
12-117(1), 12-120(3), and 12-121. All three statutes are expressly applicable to
the State, but they all only provide for the award of attorney fees to the prevailing
party.
Syringa Networks v. Idaho Dept. ofAdmin., 155 Idaho 55, 67-68, 305 P.3d 499, 511-512 (2013).

Whether this is a proper rule or an "exception" under which a governmental entity may
seek fees is a distinction without merit, and the Counties' reliance on Idaho Code § 12-121 is
appropriate. This Court has explained that:
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 specifies the procedure for requesting an award of
attorney fees on appeal, and LC. § 12-121 allows an award of "reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing party." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l)
provides, "attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by
the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."
Oregon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 148 Idaho 47, 54, 218 P.3d 391, 398,
(2009).

Should the Counties prevail on Cross-Appeal, they submit there are certain issues that
TracFone defended without foundation. The first is TracFone's argument that Ms. Baldino could
lay proper foundation for the absence of FCC records in person or via affidavit. On appeal,
TracFone argues (incorrectly) that the issues surrounding the Baldino Affidavit are moot,
because the information it sought to admit is contained in another affidavit. But, the information

17

Response Brief, p. 40, fn. 21.
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is not included in the other affidavit.
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And rather than support its position in its appellate

briefing, TracFone submits that if its mootness argument fails, this Court is invited to locate its
briefing and arguments submitted below, and apply those on appeal. Response Brief, p. 38.
TracFone also continues to argue that its counsel's beliefs about statutory intent, an
internet pamphlet and comments included in the minutes of the volunteer IEEC committee are
legal authority which must be considered by the District Court, and forwards that its
resubmission of the already stricken Affidavits was allowable, because the second submission
was for a different purpose than the first. Yet, in its briefing, TracFone admits both submissions
were to support statutory interpretation arguments.
Based on the above and the arguments made in the Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief, the
Counties ask that attorney fees be awarded to them.
III. CONCLUSION
The Idaho Legislature's intent was made clear when it adopted the Idaho Emergency
Communications Act:
[I]t is hereby declared that the intent and purpose of the provisions of this act are
to . . . [p]rovide authority to counties and 911 service areas to impose an
emergency communications fee on the use of telephone lines, wireless, VoIP or
other communications services that connect an individual dialing 911 to an
established public safety answering point. ...
Idaho Code§ 31-4801(2)(a) (emphasis added).
With this codified intent in mind, and based on the arguments contained in the CrossAppellants' Joint Brief and herein, the Counties respectfully request that this Court reverse the
District Court's determination that TracFone is not a wireless carrier pursuant to Idaho Code

21

I

•I
§ 31-4802(15) and thus not a telecommunications provider pursuant to Idaho Code
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§ 31-4802( 13 )(b), and Ada County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District
Court's admission of the above Affidavits into evidence .
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